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I. INTRODUCTION 
In North America, Indigenous peoples have lived, governed, 
stewarded, and spiritually connected to places, territories, and homelands 
since time immemorial.1 With European invasion in the Western 
Hemisphere, genocide was perpetrated along the east coast of the continent 
and spread to other areas. Turtle Island, as it is lovingly called by Indigenous 
peoples, was given to Native peoples by the Creator.2 By the late 1400s to 
1700s, invaders caused the lands to be a bloody battleground as the 
Europeans, including the British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, Russian, and 
Spanish, brought their conflicts over power and territory to this 
hemisphere.3 Early on, Tribal Nations engaged in commerce with the 
newcomers, but soon turned to defending their peoples and lands.4 
As Europeans targeted the Western Hemisphere for exploitation 
of natural resources by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,5 the Native 
peoples in Central America were subjected to enslavement, torture, and 
complete annihilation as the European Spanish male military seized Native 
lands and resources that had been stewarded and were intended for future 
generations of Native societies.6 The encomienda system established by 
Spanish colonizers condemned Indigenous peoples to lives of forced labor, 
every form of abuse and maltreatment, and the attempted destruction of 
                                                           
ǂ Co-Director, Native American Law and Sovereignty (NALS) Institute and Professor of Law, 
Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
ǂǂ  My Dakota name is included. This Article is dedicated to the amazing law students I have 
had the honor to teach throughout my years as a law professor. To those who now represent 
Tribal Nations, I encourage you to keep holding on to a vision of justice for the generations 
to come. 
1 See Angelique EagleWoman, Indigenous Historic Trade in the Western Hemisphere, in 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: BUILDING EQUITABLE AND INCLUSIVE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, 43, 44–45 (John Borrows & Risa 
Schwartz eds., 2020) [hereinafter EagleWoman, Indigenous Historic Trade]. 
2 Joyce Tekahnawiiaks King, The Value of Water and the Meaning of Water Law for the 
Native Americans Known as the Haudenosaunee, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 466 
(2007). 
3 Angelique EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding Commercial Prosperity in 
Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints—Recommendations for Economic Revitalization in Indian 
Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383, 388–89 (2008). 
4 See ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 57–59 (2014). 
5 See generally JACK WEATHERFORD, INDIAN GIVERS: HOW THE INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS 
TRANSFORMED THE WORLD (1989). 
6 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 34, 59; Angelique EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic 
Experience of Genocide for American Indians and Alaska Natives in the United States: The 
Call to Recognize Full Human Rights as Set Forth in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 424, 426–28 (2015) [hereinafter 
EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide]. 
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Indigenous governance, culture, and spiritual ceremonies.7 To the north, 
many Tribal Nations were willing to educate, enter peaceful relations, and 
develop longstanding treaty relationships with the men from British, Dutch, 
French, and Russian origins.8 This willingness to trade, interact, and 
intermarry was viewed as an opportunity to exploit the lands, peoples, and 
cultures of the Western Hemisphere.9 
For Tribal Nation leaders, the newcomers were often received 
with sympathy and allowed in the communal circle with hospitality.10 A long 
tradition of alliances, confederacies, and treaty-making had been the norm 
in the Americas prior to European arrival.11 The basis of the tribal worldview 
is kinship and obligations based on the status of relatives in an 
interdependent living world.12 In some societies, prophecies foretold of 
cataclysmic change that would ensue upon the arrival of foreigners, but 
nothing could fully prepare the tribal governments sustainably managing 
large territories for the onslaught that occurred in the 1600s and 1700s 
across North America.13 
II. DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY, BRITISH TREATY-MAKING 
TO U.S. TREATY-MAKING 
To justify the invasion and claiming of Indigenous peoples’ 
homelands, Christianity and Roman Catholic church officials supplied 
doctrine and documentation granting authority to European monarchs to 
subdue Indigenous peoples, characterized as “pagans,” “infidels,” and non-
Christians, establish authority over trade networks, and gain superior title to 
their lands.14  “In fact, the language that English monarchs used in the 
charters they granted to the American colonists was derived from Pope 
Alexander VI’s Inter catera ([1493]), the legal basis for Spanish possession 
                                                           
7 EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide, supra note 6, at 426–28. 
8 See ROBERT WILLIAMS, LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS 
OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, 21–28 (1st ed. 1997). 
9 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 144. 
10 WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 28. 
11 Id. at 32–33. 
12 EagleWoman, Indigenous Historic Trade, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
13 Stephen A. Colston, “No Longer Will There Be a Mexico”: Omens, Prophecies, and the 
Conquest of the Aztec Empire, 9 AM. INDIAN Q. 239-258 (1985). For a recent example of 
the Black Snake Lakota prophecy and the resistance efforts to the Dakota Access Pipeline 
see Danielle Delaney, Under Coyote’s Mask: Environmental Law, Indigenous Identity, and 
#NODAPL, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 299, 300 (2019); Andrew Rome, The Black Snake on 
the Periphery: The Dakota Access Pipeline and Tribal Jurisdictional Sovereignty, 93 N.D. 
L. REV. 57, 58 (2018). 
14 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1] (Nell Jessup Newton ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
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of the Americas (except Brazil).”15 The kings of England would assert 
authority to convert Indigenous peoples to Christianity as justification for 
invasion, monopolizing trade, and the seizing of Indigenous lands in 
charters.16 Thus, Europeans, including British, Portuguese, and Spanish 
men, claimed superior title and authority by stepping foot on Indigenous 
lands armed with legal arguments based on the Christian doctrine of 
discovery.17 “The Doctrine provided that Europeans automatically acquired 
property rights in native lands and gained governmental, political, and 
commercial rights over the indigenous inhabitants without their knowledge 
or consent.”18 
In the northernmost areas of the continent, British, French, and 
Dutch men infiltrated Indigenous commerce networks under the guise of 
partnership and kinship. They built wooden structures and declared 
themselves permanently established, although under legal principles, their 
claims were little more than squatters’ rights. British, French, and Dutch 
men often sought Indigenous wives to garner the trust of commercial 
partners.19 The abandonment of the Indigenous families that resulted upon 
the emigration of European women often deprived the first wives from a 
share in the commercial ventures made possible by those common law 
marriages.20 With intermarriage and trade relationships, European officials 
began to understand certain aspects of Tribal Nations’ governance, societal 
obligations, and territories.21 
The British monarchy sent men under the authority of its charters 
to build warehouse structures and enter commercial relationships with 
promises of kinship and loyalty to Tribal Nations and peoples. Examples of 
this practice include the charters by King James I for the 1606 Virginia 
Company and the 1606 Plymouth Company,22 and by King Charles II for 
the 1670 Hudson Bay Company.23 These companies led to the British 
                                                           
15 James Muldoon, Discovery, Grant, Charter, Conquest, or Purchase: John Adams on the 
Legal Basis for English Possession of North America, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY 
AMERICA, 31 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001). 
16 Id. at 34–36. 
17 Robert J. Miller, American Indians, The Doctrine of Discovery, and Manifest Destiny, 11 
WYO. L. REV. 329, 330 (2011). 
18 Id. 
19 Bethany Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934, 21 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 25–28 (1997). 
20 See id. at 5, 26, 42. 
21 Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimensions of Nineteenth Century Immigration Law, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1409–13 (2009). 
22 See Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to 
the Claim of “University Recognition” of the Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 
481, 523-525 (2006). 
23 See Robert J. Miller, The International Law of Colonialism: A Comparative Analysis, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 847, 869–872 (2011). 
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monarchy chartering colonies by the mid-1600s for permanent settlement 
in North America.24 To ensure the longevity of these activities and 
monopolize certain aspects of trade, the British monarchy sought treaty 
agreements with Tribal Nation leadership.25 Over time, land-hungry 
colonists defied British treaty relationships and began to claim territory from 
direct conveyances with Tribal Nations or simply by staking claim to tribal 
lands. French nationalists sought alignment with Tribal Nations against the 
British to continue their European-based tug-of-war.26 This led to what is 
commonly referred to as the “French and Indian War” in North America, 
or the “Seven Years War” when referring to the conflict originating in 
Europe.27 
In the aftermath of the war, King George III recognized the need 
to maintain boundaries as agreed upon with Tribal Nations.28 Ironically, 
historians have referred to the tribal military actions during this time period 
as Indian “uprisings” rather than as actual wars against the European 
invaders.29 To be clear, an uprising is defined as “a usually localized act of 
popular violence in defiance of usually an established government.”30 More 
accurately, Tribal Nations were defending their territories and governments 
against the uprisings of the opportunistic invaders from British and French 
backgrounds as tribal governments were the established governments in 
North America in the mid-1700s. 
As the intentions of the British and French revealed themselves, 
Indigenous leaders demanded adherence to official agreements, alliances, 
and boundaries to ensure long-term peaceful interactions and stability.31 
                                                           
24 Watson, supra note 22, at 527–531. 
25 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[1]. 
26 Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from 
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 405, 424–25 (2003). 
27 See id. at 424. 
28 Id. at 425. 
29 See BERNARD KNOLLENBERG, ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1759-1766, 103–
04 (1960) (describing the tribal military efforts to expel the British from tribal territories from 
May 1763 to March 1764). 
Amherst’s contribution to provoking the uprising is, however, only part 
of the story. The other is the failure of the British army, when the long-
threatened rebellion at last broke out, to protect the Pennsylvania and 
Virginia frontiers from the horrors of Indian raids or to carry out 
Amherst’s confident threat of prompt and crushing punishment of any 
Indians who might dare rebel.  
Id. 
30 Uprising, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/uprising [https://perma.cc/ZAL4-4RD6]. 
31 Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Doctrine of Discovery: Aboriginal Title, Tribal 
Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy 
in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 722–23 (2004).  
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With the Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued by King George III of England 
in the aftermath of defeating French military forces aligned with some Tribal 
Nations, settlement by British subjects was curtailed west of the Appalachian 
Mountains in line with prior treaty agreements with Tribal Nations.32 
Relevant text of the Proclamation provided for the removal of British 
subjects as follows: 
And we do further strictly enjoin and require all Persons 
whatever who have either wilfully or inadvertently seated 
themselves upon any Lands within the Countries above 
described. or upon any other Lands which, not having 
been ceded to or purchased by Us, are still reserved to the 
said Indians as aforesaid, forthwith to remove themselves 
from such Settlements.33 
The Proclamation further denied legal authority or action by any individual 
seeking to purchase lands, and required information be supplied to 
government officials if Tribal Nation leaders expressed a willingness to sell 
their lands.  
And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been 
committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great 
Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction 
of the said Indians: In order, therefore, to prevent such 
Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians 
may be convinced of our Justice and determined 
Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent, 
We do, with the Advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin 
and require, that no private Person do presume to make 
any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved 
to the said Indians, within those parts of our Colonies 
where We have thought proper to allow Settlement[.]34 
Finally, this Royal Proclamation provided that individuals secure licenses to 
trade with Tribal Nations that were issued by British government officials. 
Various colonial governments enacted similar regulations for commercial 
transactions involving Indigenous tradespeople and British subjects.35 As 
many colonists were land speculators, they were angered by the restraints 
imposed on seizing tribal lands.36 
                                                           
32 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[1]. 
33 JOHN J. BORROWS & LEONARD I. ROTMAN, ABORIGINAL LEGAL ISSUES: CASES, 
MATERIALS & COMMENTARY 16 (5th ed. 2018). 
34 Id. at 16–17. 
35 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[1]. 
36  Id. 
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A. The Treaty of Niagara in 1764 
The next year, the largest gathering of Tribal Nations with British 
officials occurred, leading to the Treaty of Niagara entered on August 1, 
1764.37 The meeting was viewed as establishing a multinational agreement 
and implementing the Royal Proclamation of 1763 through assurances of 
alliance with the British representatives.38 
The treaty at Niagara was entered into in July and August 
of 1764, and was regarded as ‘the most widely 
representative gathering of American Indians ever 
assembled,’ as approximately two thousand chiefs attended 
the negotiations. There were over twenty-four Nations 
gathered with ‘representative nations as far east as Nova 
Scotia, and as far west as Mississippi, and as far north as 
Hudson Bay.’ It is also possible that representatives from 
even further afield participated in the treaty as some 
records indicate that the Cree and Lakota (Sioux) nations 
were also present at this event. It is obvious that a 
substantial number of First Nations people attended the 
gathering at Niagara. Aboriginal people throughout the 
Great Lakes and northern, eastern, and western colonial 
regions had travelled for weeks and months to attend this 
meeting.39 
Yet, this historic event is largely left out of the history of North America.  
This event led to the expectation of good faith by Tribal Nations as they 
relied on statements and actions from the British officials and colonists 
present at the meeting. “At this gathering, a nation-to-nation relationship 
between settler and First Nation peoples was renewed and extended, and 
the Covenant Chain of Friendship, a multinational alliance in which no 
member gave up their sovereignty, was affirmed.”40 During the treaty 
council, in keeping with tribal political culture, the British officials 
exchanged gifts, wampum, and other items of value to demonstrate good 
faith within kinship relations.41 
Following the rule of law, the British officials present at the 
meeting, under the authority of the King of England, promised to act in 
good faith towards the Tribal Nations and respect their lands and 
                                                           
37 John Borrows, Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, 
and Self-Government, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW, 
EQUALITY, AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE 155, 161, 169 (Michael Asch ed., 1997). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 163. 
40 Id. at 161. 
41 Id. at 163. 
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governments.42 Within the tribal concept of kinship, both good faith and 
security in promises were viewed as adhering to a spiritual higher natural 
law sealed with gift exchanges, words of promise, and ceremonial prayers.43 
B.  British Colonies form the United States of America 
Shifting sands once more permeated the foundation for Tribal 
Nation relations with the Europeans living in villages on Native soil when 
the British leaders of colonies rejected the authority of the British 
monarchy. This phase of British warfare has been commonly referred to as 
the American Revolution by U.S. historians, dated approximately 1775 to 
1783.44 As the rebellion gained traction, Tribal Nations were at times 
regarded as strategic allies, in some instances lending military forces and 
reinforcements.45 
The United States issued a declaration of independence on July 
4, 1776.46 As the newly-formed nation-state, the first treaty it entered into 
was the Treaty with the Delawares on September 17, 1778.47 Article II of 
the Treaty expressed “perpetual peace and friendship . . . through all 
succeeding generations.”48 In Article III, the Delaware Nation pledged to 
allow free passage of U.S. troops engaged in warfare with the King of 
England through Delaware lands, to provide “corn, meat, horses, or 
whatever may be in their power for the accommodation of such troops,” 
and “such a number of their best and most expert warriors as they can 
spare.”49 
In return, the Delaware Nation received many promises. The 
United States pledged “to guarantee to the aforesaid nation of Delawares, 
and their heirs, all their territorial rights in the fullest and most ample 
                                                           
42 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[1]. 
43 See WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 125.  
Indians insist on acts of commitment from their treaty partners—signs 
that human beings, in a world of diversity and conflict, can learn to trust 
each other. Smoking the pipe of peace, taking hold of a treaty partner 
by the hand, exchanging hostages, and presenting valuable gifts were just 
some of the ways human beings could demonstrate steadfast 
commitment to upholding their treaty relationships. 
Id. 
44 See, e.g., KNOLLENBERG, supra note 29, at xxi. 
45 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[2]. 
46 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
47 Treaty with the Delawares, Delaware-U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, reprinted in 2 INDIAN 
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 3 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904), 
https://dc.library.okstate.edu/digital/collection/kapplers/id/25854 [https://perma.cc/7NG3-
MCCG] [hereinafter KAPPLER’S]. 
48 Id. at Art. II.  
49 Id. at Art. III. 
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manner.”50 The Delaware Nation was to invite other Tribal Nations to the 
confederation under the Treaty, with the Delaware Nation as the head.51 In 
terms of political relationships, the United States further promised the 
Delaware Nation to “have a representation in Congress.”52 It should be 
noted that these promises were not kept by the United States as the 
Delaware Nation eventually was scattered by warfare and fought to establish 
a permanent homeland in what is now Oklahoma.53 
III. PERMANENT HOMELANDS AND TREATY RELATIONSHIPS 
As the former British subjects sought to gain property and 
establish land rights, treaty relationships were viewed as necessary tools for 
the expansion of the newly declared nation-state. The first U.S. president, 
George Washington, viewed treaties as expedient means to dispossess 
Tribal Nations of their lands, instead of engaging in warfare.54  This was a 
far cry from the rule of law when Washington considered treaties with 
Tribal Nations. 
For example, in a letter penned by Washington in 1783, he 
detailed his views on policy for Indian affairs to James Duane. Washington 
made clear his lack of principles or adherence to good faith with Tribal 
Nations. 
At first view, it may seem a little extraneous, when I am 
called upon to give an opinion upon the terms of a Peace 
proper to be made with the Indians, that I should go into 
the formation of New States; but the Settlemt. [sic] of the 
Western Country and making a Peace with the Indians are 
so analogous that there can be no definition of the other. 
For I repeat it, again, and I am clear in my opinion, that 
policy and occonomy [sic] point very strongly to the 
expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and 
the propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference to 
attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their 
Country; which as we have already experienced is like 
driving the Wild Beasts of the Forest which will return as 
soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on those 
left there; when the gradual extension of our Settlements 
will as certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire, both 
                                                           
50 Id. at Art. VI. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
53 Nekole Alligood, The History of Delaware Nation, DELAWARE NATION, 
https://www.delawarenation-nsn.gov/history/ [https://perma.cc/SW5G-ZRD7]. 
54 See EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience, supra note 6, at 431–32. 
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being beasts of prey tho’ [sic] they differ in shape. In a word 
there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian War but the 
Soil they live on and without that bloodshed and those 
distresses which helpless Women and Children are made 
partakers of in all kinds of disputes with them.55 
From this statement of policy, the man who became the first leader of the 
United States of America did not intend to uphold the rule of law with 
Tribal Nations as he viewed tribal peoples as “beasts” and as “savage.”56 
These racist views of American Indians as less than human and enemies 
were hidden in the formal treaty councils where U.S. officials traveled to the 
seats of tribal governments to enter into legal agreements.57 
A.  U.S. Constitution and Tribal Nations 
With the adoption of the U.S Constitution on September 17, 
1787, tribal governments and American Indians are mentioned only a few 
times. Tribal Nations were not parties, nor were they consulted on the 
document. In Article I, Section 8, the U.S. Congress has the authority “[t]o 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian tribes.”58 In the original Article I, Section 2, clause 3, a 
formula for taxation was set forth and contained the language “excluding 
Indians not taxed.”59 As American Indians were not citizens of the United 
States, no taxation was assessed, and state representation was tied to 
taxation. 
The role of treaties in the U.S. Constitution is outlined in both 
the authority of the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the hierarchy of 
federal law. Under the Presidential Power set forth in Article II, Section 2, 
the U.S. President has the authority as follows: “He shall have power, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided 
                                                           
55 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 2 (2000). 
56 See id. 
57 Natsu Taylor Saito, Race and Decolonization: Whiteness as Property in the American 
Settler Colonial Project, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 31, 52 (2015).  
Within their system of property relations, the title they have granted 
themselves gives the settlers the right to forcibly remove American 
Indians from lands they have occupied since time immemorial, to 
slaughter them at will, to imprison them, and to dictate how they will 
live. By racializing Indians as savage, warlike, nomadic, and without law, 
the settlers have attempted to reconcile these actions with their self-
appointed “civilizing mission” and their “American values” of freedom 
and democracy. 
Id.; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian 
Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 166–67 (2008). 
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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two thirds of the Senators present concur.”60 Thus, the U.S. Senate serves 
as further approval for the agreement to enter into a treaty. The Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in Article VI provides:  
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.61  
These are the key rules of law for treaty-making by the United States. 
Between 1778 and 1871, the United States entered into over four 
hundred treaties with Tribal Nations throughout mid-North America.62 The 
early treaties identified the power and strength of Tribal Nations as allies to 
the United States in its warfare against former kinsmen, the British.63 Land 
purchases, called cessions, were the most common provisions of the treaty 
agreements with Tribal Nations.64 The United States sought to expand and 
promised allegiance to Tribal Nations as good faith partners in friendship 
that was “perpetual.”65  
Under an appropriations act in 1871, the U.S. Congress set forth 
a change in the policy of the United States on treaty-making with Tribal 
Nations as follows: 
No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United 
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an 
independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United 
                                                           
60 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
61 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
62 ANGELIQUE EAGLEWOMAN & STACY LEEDS, MASTERING AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 11 (2d 
ed. 2019). 
63 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at § 1.03[1]. 
64 Id. at § 1.03[1]. 
65 See Treaty with the Delawares, Delaware-U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, reprinted in 
KAPPLER’S, supra note 47, at 3 (“Article 2. That a perpetual peace and friendship shall from 
henceforth take place, and subsist between the contracting parties aforesaid, through all 
succeeding generations.”); Treaty with the Iowa, Sept. 16, 1815, 7 Stat. 136, reprinted in 
KAPPLER’S, supra note 47, at 123 (“Article 2. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship 
between all the citizens of the United States and all the individuals composing the said Iaway 
[sic] tribe or nation.”); Treaty with the Sioux-Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands, Sioux-U.S., July 
23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949, reprinted in KAPPLER’S, supra note 47, at 588 (“Article 1. It is 
stipulated and solemnly agreed that the peace and friendship now so happily existing between 
the United States and the aforesaid bands of Indians, shall be perpetual.”); Treaty with the 
Eastern Shoshoni, Eastern Shoshoni-U.S., July 12, 1863, 18 Stat. 685, reprinted in 
KAPPLER’S, supra note 47, at 848 (“Article 1. Friendly and amically [sic] relations are hereby 
re-established between the bands of the Shoshonee nation, parties hereto, and the United 
States; and it is declared that a firm and perpetual peace shall be henceforth maintained 
between the Shoshonee nation and the United States.”).  
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States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty 
lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or 
tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or 
impaired. Such treaties, and any Executive orders and Acts 
of Congress under which the rights of any Indian tribe to 
fish are secured, shall be construed to prohibit (in addition 
to any other prohibition) the imposition under any law of 
a State or political subdivision thereof of any tax on any 
income derived from the exercise of rights to fish secured 
by such treaty, Executive order, or Act of Congress if 
section 7873 of title 26 does not permit a like Federal tax 
to be imposed on such income.66 
While this signaled to the U.S. President that future agreements would not 
be funded by appropriations acts, the impact was to “make agreements with 
the Indians, but now both houses [of Congress] approved them.”67 These 
new methods of recognizing reservations and transacting land cessions were 
“virtually identical to those established by treaties.”68 
There seemed to be multiple mental gymnastics in changing the 
rule of law regarding treaty/political relationships between Tribal Nations 
and the United States to the status desired by the United States of total 
control over tribal lands and peoples. 
Tribal Nations are extra-constitutional, meaning there is no 
role for tribal governments in the U.S. Constitution, and 
furthermore, the Tribes have never consented to 
participate in the U.S. constitutional structure. Without 
identifying any constitutional foundation, federal courts 
classify the relationship between Tribes and the U.S. 
government as political, and affirm that the U.S. Congress 
has “plenary” authority over Tribes. In the U.S. 
Constitution, the U.S. Congress has the ability “[t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes” and this one 
phrase has been stretched into “plenary” authority over 
Tribal Nations.69 
This re-characterization and twisting of the law from the U.S. Constitution 
as applied to American Indians and their governments can be found in all 
three branches of the United States, from the U.S. Congress to the U.S. 
Supreme Court to the U.S. Executive. This will be discussed more fully 
below. 
                                                           
66 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988). 
67 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.03[9]. 
68 Id. 
69 Angelique EagleWoman, Bringing Balance to Mid-North America: Re-Structuring the 
Sovereign Relationships Between Tribal Nations and the United States, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 
671, 678 (2012). 
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B.  Status of American Indians and Imposition of U.S. Naturalization 
in 1924 
 American Indians formed their own governments as Tribal 
Nations since time immemorial in the Western Hemisphere. They were 
not U.S. citizens when the U.S. Constitution was adopted or amended. In 
the first section of the April 9, 1866, Civil Rights Act, the citizens of the 
United States were described as “all persons born in the United States, and 
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.”70 The 
acknowledgment of American Indians as citizens of Tribal Nations and not 
the United States continued after the formal adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in July 1868.71  
In Elk v. Wilkins,72 the U.S. Supreme Court expressly stated that 
American Indians had to undergo a naturalization process to become 
United States citizens.73 “Since the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress has passed several acts for naturalizing Indians of 
certain tribes, which would have been superfluous if they were, or might 
become without any action of the government, citizens of the United 
States.”74 Mr. Elk had been refused the ability to vote in Nebraska elections 
as an Indian, although he had severed all ties with his tribal government.75 
In denying his right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution,76 the Court stated:  
But the question whether any Indian tribes, or any 
members thereof, have become so far advanced in 
civilization, that they should be let out of the state of 
pupilage, and admitted to the privileges and responsibilities 
of citizenship, is a question to be decided by the nation 
                                                           
70 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27–30. 
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Id. 
72 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
73 Id. at 103. 
74 Id. at 104. 
75 Id. at 95. 
76 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”).  
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whose wards they are and whose citizens they seek to 
become, and not by each Indian for himself.77 
Thus, the U.S. Constitutional provisions “excluding Indians not taxed” have 
been interpreted as an acknowledgment that Tribal Nations contained 
citizens as “Indians” that were outside of the legal status of U.S. citizens.78 
Over time, treaty provisions and federal laws recognized a dual citizenship 
status for American Indians in federally recognized Tribal Nations.79 
Without the consent of Tribal Nations, the U.S. Congress in 1924 
naturalized all American Indians as citizens with passage of the Indian 
Citizenship Act (commonly called the Snyder Act).80  
As voting laws are within the authority of state governments, 
American Indians in some states have been denied the right to vote in state 
and federal elections up to recent memory, for example, in South Dakota 
in the 1960s and 1970s.81 Thus, American Indians have a political status as 
dual citizens in maintaining reservation lands and tribal governments, 
including both tribal citizenship and U.S. citizenship.82  
C.  Property Rights of Tribal Nations and the United States Through 
Treaties 
By entering into treaties with Tribal Nations, the United States 
acquired territory and land title to assert jurisdiction and governance over. 
Tribal Nations continued to assert governance and jurisdiction over 
reserved lands known as reservations and cultural/sacred sites both on and 
off reserved lands.83 The rule of law was at times adhered to within the U.S. 
government and courts and at other times completely flouted in favor of 
legal fictions regarding the legal agreements with tribal governments.84 With 
the ambitions of the U.S. to expand and corral resources owned since time 
immemorial by Indigenous governments, the rule of law was often twisted 
into justifications for U.S. land grabs. 
                                                           
77 Wilkins, 112 U.S. at 106–107. 
78 Id. 
79 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 14.01[1]. 
80 See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)). 
81 See Kaitlyn Schaeffer, The Need for Federal Legislation to Address Native Voter 
Suppression, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 707, 712 (2019); see also Kristopher A. 
Reed, Back to the Future: How the Holding of Shelby County v. Holder Has Been a Reality 
for South Dakota Native Americans Since 1975, 62 S.D. L. REV. 143 (2017). 
82 See Matthew L. Fletcher, Politics, Indian Law, and the Constitution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 
495, 532 (2020). 
83 See id. 
84 See Hope A. Babcock, The Stories We Tell, and Have Told, About Tribal Sovereignty: 
Legal Fictions at Their Most Pernicious, 55 VILL. L. REV. 803 (2010). 
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1. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Mixing Religious/Racial Doctrine 
with Law 
In the 1800s, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, 
skewed the property rights of Tribal Nations and diminished the legal status 
of tribal governments. A set of three decisions, commonly called “the 
Marshall Trilogy,” after U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, 
handed down a framework of diminished property and sovereignty rights of 
tribal governments that remain in place today.85 In the first decision of 
Johnson v. M’Intosh,86 the U.S. Supreme Court limited tribal government 
property rights by incorporating the “doctrine of discovery” into U.S. law.87  
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great 
nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves 
so much of it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast 
extent offered an ample field to the ambition and 
enterprise of all; and the character and religion of its 
inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a 
people over whom the superior genius of Europe might 
claim an ascendency. The potentates of the old world 
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they 
made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, 
by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in 
exchange for unlimited independence. But, as they were all 
in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in 
order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war 
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should 
acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition, 
which they all asserted, should be regulated as between 
themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to 
the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, 
it was made, against all other European governments, 
which title might be consummated by possession.88 
Embracing the edicts of the papal bulls in enunciating the “doctrine of 
discovery” to grant Christians superior title to non-Christian lands, the U.S. 
Supreme Court established the basis for dispossessing Tribal Nations of 
their property through legal fictions.89 The opinion provided that Indian 
tribes lacked full ownership of their lands and instead held occupancy title 
                                                           
85 Id. at 825–30. 
86 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
87 Id. at 572–73. 
88 Id. 
89 See Miller, supra note 17, at 335–36. 
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at the whim of the United States government.90 The United States as the 
successor to Great Britain acquired superior title to all tribal lands through 
the “doctrine of discovery.”91 Further, the extinguishment of tribal 
occupancy title could be accomplished in one of two ways: through purchase 
or through conquest.92 
The second and third decisions focused on the treaties between 
the Cherokee Nation and the United States. In the 1831 decision, Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia,93 the Tribal Nation brought suit when the state of Georgia 
sought to assert its jurisdiction over Cherokee lands and nullify the 
Cherokee government in their homelands.94 Unbeknownst to the Cherokee 
Nation, the United States promised in a subsequent agreement with the state 
officials of Georgia that once the Cherokee Nation was removed from their 
homelands, Georgia would have title to those lands.95 When the United 
States was slow to violate treaties with the Cherokee Nation, state officials 
took matters into their own hands by surveying Cherokee lands, asserting 
criminal jurisdiction over Cherokee citizens, and enforcing an oath of loyalty 
to Georgia prior to White entry into Cherokee territory.96 
By reviewing the Indian Commerce Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall opined that Indian tribes were listed 
separately from foreign nations and, therefore, lacked standing to bring a 
                                                           
90 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. 
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original 
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were 
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to 
be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to 
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; 
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were 
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their 
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original 
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who 
made it.  
Id. 
91 Id. at 584–85. 
92 Id. at 587.  
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and 
broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They 
hold, and assert in themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They 
maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive 
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or 
by conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty, as the 
circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise. 
Id. 
93 30 U.S. 1, 1 (1831). 
94 Id. at 15. 
95 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.03[4][a]. 
96 Neyooxet Greymorning, The Anglocentric Supremacy of the Marshall Court, 10 ALB. 
GOV’T L. REV. 191, 216 (2017). 
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case into the federal court under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution.97 Marshall created a new term in U.S. law for tribal 
governments as “domestic dependent nations” and dismissed the action for 
enforcement of the treaties entered into with the U.S. government.98 
Further, Marshall asserted that the Cherokee Nation, and all Indian tribes, 
were in a ward/guardian relationship with the United States and in a state of 
“pupilage.”99 The opinion did not rely on the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution where treaties are categorized as the supreme law of the land. 
The rule of law was not adhered to in this opinion as the decision 
sidestepped the legal obligations of the United States in treaties, forever 
guaranteeing U.S. recognition of the Cherokee Nation reserved land base.100 
Next, suit was brought by U.S. citizen and missionary, Samuel 
Worcester, who entered Cherokee Nation lands under the authority of the 
U.S. government and the Cherokee leadership but refused to swear loyalty 
                                                           
97 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18–19. 
98 Id. at 17. 
99 Id.  
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their 
will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of 
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. 
Id. 
100 Id. at 16.  
The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize 
them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, 
of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their 
engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the 
United States by any individual of their community. Laws have been 
enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly 
recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and the courts are bound by 
those acts. A question of much more difficulty remains. Do the 
Cherokees constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution? 
Id. 
17
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under state law to Georgia.101 In Worcester v. Georgia,102 the U.S. Supreme 
Court could not sidestep the issue of whether Georgia law could override 
federal law and treaties. In Marshall’s decision, there is a recognition of the 
political and legal relationship between the Cherokee Nation and the U.S. 
government, as evidenced in treaties.103 “The treaties and laws of the United 
States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of 
the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on 
exclusively by the government of the union.”104 The holding from this 
decision established that federal law pre-empted state law in Indian affairs. 
These three decisions provided the framework in U.S. law to 
undermine the rule of law for tribal governments as denying full property 
ownership rights, denying full sovereign authority, imposing a ward/guardian 
relationship, and setting up a tug of war between the federal and state 
governments with the U.S. Supreme Court acting as mediator.105 This 
framework has become embedded in U.S. law, with these statements in 
                                                           
101 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542 (1832).  
It has been said at the bar, that the acts of the legislature of Georgia seize 
on the whole Cherokee country, parcel it out among the neighbouring 
[sic] counties of the state, extend her code over the whole country, 
abolish its institutions and its laws, and annihilate its political existence. 
If this be the general effect of the system, let us inquire into the effect of 
the particular statute and section on which the indictment is founded. It 
enacts that “all white persons, residing within the limits of the Cherokee 
nation on the 1st day of March next, or at any time thereafter, without a 
license or permit from his excellency the governor, or from such agent 
as his excellency the governor shall authorise [sic] to grant such permit 
or license, and who shall not have taken the oath hereinafter required, 
shall be guilty of a high misdemeanour [sic], and, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by confinement to the penitentiary, at hard 
labour [sic], for a term not less than four years.” The eleventh section 
authorises [sic] the governor, “should he deem it necessary for the 
protection of the mines, or the enforcement of the laws in force within 
the Cherokee nation, to raise and organise [sic] a guard” . . . The 
thirteenth section enacts, “that the said guard or any member of them, 
shall be, and they are hereby authorised [sic] and empowered to arrest 
any person legally charged with or detected in a violation of the laws of 
this state, and to convey, as soon as practicable, the person so arrested, 
before a justice of the peace, judge of the superior, or justice of interior 
court of this state, to be dealt with according to law.” 
Id. 
102 Id. at 515. 
103 Id. at 555 (“This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one 
more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting 
as subjects to the laws of a master.”).  
104 Id. at 557. 
105 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 
579, 596 (2008). 
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contravention of the sovereign-to-sovereign relationships with tribal 
governments continuing to the present day.106  
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed jurisprudence upholding 
treaty rights.107 In doing so, the land title claimed by the U.S. under treaties 
has been maintained through land cessions by Tribal Nations.108 As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has reviewed treaty instruments with Tribal Nations, the 
Court established the Indian canons of construction to fairly interpret treaty 
provisions.109 Treaties were written in English by officials authorized by the 
United States and often contained legal terminology not easily or effectively 
translated into tribal languages.110  
The Indian canons of construction were developed over time and 
are understood as interpretive tools which can be summarized as follows: 
                                                           
106 See Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now, 33 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1183, 1193–94 (2000). 
Some years ago, Felix Cohen frankly acknowledged that talk of 
guardianship legitimates ‘congressional legislation that would have been 
unconstitutional if applied to non-Indians.’ So was the moral obligation 
invoked to extend United States criminal jurisdiction into reservations, 
to take tribal property in violation of treaties, and to reduce Indian lands 
under the Dawes Act (allotment) from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to 
48,000,000 by 1934. And so has the trust obligation been invoked as a 
defense against paying just compensation for taking tribal property. The 
Court has said that, when Congress acts ‘as trustee for the benefit of the 
Indians, exercising its plenary powers over Indians and their property, 
as it thinks in their best interests’ and ‘transmutes the property from land 
to money, there is no taking’ in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Id.  
107 See U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a 
grant of right from them,-a reservation of those not granted. And the 
form of the instrument and its language was adapted to that purpose. 
Reservations were not of particular parcels of land, and could not be 
expressed in deeds, as dealings between private individuals. The 
reservations were in large areas of territory and the negotiations were 
with the tribe. They reserved rights, however, to every individual Indian, 
as though named therein. They imposed a servitude upon every piece 
of land as though described therein. There was an exclusive right of 
fishing reserved within certain boundaries. 
Id.  
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 380–81. 
And we have said we will construe a treaty with the Indians as ‘that 
unlettered people’ understood it, and ‘as justice and reason demand, in 
all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they 
owe care and protection,’ and counterpoise the inequality ‘by the 
superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right, without 
regard to technical rules.’ 
Id. 
110 See id. 
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“1) treaties are to be construed as the Indians would have understood them, 
2) any ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the Indian understanding 
of the treaty document, and 3) all powers and rights are reserved to a Tribe 
unless expressly relinquished in a treaty document.”111 Over time, the Indian 
canons of construction have been applied beyond treaty interpretation to 
statutes, regulations, executive orders, and agreements intended to benefit 
American Indians.112 As interpretive tools, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
discretion on whether to apply the Indian canons of construction and can 
circumvent their application by finding no ambiguity requiring 
interpretation or simply disregarding their application.113 
2. Pendulum Swing of U.S. Indian Policy to Recognize or Eliminate 
Tribal Nations 
 Scholars in the field of federal Indian law have likened the 
shifting policy eras of the U.S. government to a pendulum swinging between 
contradictory points, the recognition of the legal status of tribal 
governments, and efforts to eliminate tribal governmental status.114 The U.S. 
Indian policy eras are chronologically: (1) Treaty Era of sovereign-to 
sovereign relationships from 1778 to mid-1800s; (2) Removal Era of the 
1800s; (3) Reservation Era of the 1800s; (4) Assimilation/Allotment Era of 
the late-1800s through 1930s; (5) Indian Self-Government Era of the 1930s 
through 1940s; (6) Termination of Self-Government Status Era of the 1940s 
through 1960s; and (7) Indian Self-Determination Era of the late-1960s to 
the present.115  
                                                           
111 EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 62, at 12. 
112 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 2.02[1]. 
113 See Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of 
the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 659 (2011). 
These extra-judicial applications of the Justices' personal values pervade 
Indian law jurisprudence and undercut the legitimacy of the Indian 
canons. When tribes wield a ‘civilizing’ power-such as furthering 
economic interests or acting as a private landowner-or when it fits with 
the view of Indians as the guardians of nature who live off of the land, 
the tribes are much more likely to prevail under the canons. If, however, 
tribes assert their rights as governmental entities against non-Indians, the 
Court views this power as having been implicitly divested. 
Id.  
114 Vine Deloria Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 979 (1996). 
115 EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 62, at 10–22. 
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Figure 1. Depicting the U.S. government’s oscillation between recognition 
of tribal governments as sovereign and annihilation of tribal sovereignty in 
setting U.S. governmental Indian policy. 
The foundational relationship for Tribal Nations with the United 
States is the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship. In exercising sovereign 
authority to enter into treaties and other agreements with the United States, 
the Tribal Nations did not relinquish their status as tribal governments, 
capable of all the characteristics of nation-states as understood in the 
international political community.116  
Of course, the choice made by an Indian Nation to accept 
the protection of the United States, or any other more 
powerful sovereign, does nothing to diminish the capacity 
of the Indian Nation to enter into, and fulfill, agreements 
with other sovereigns. Likewise, the choice of the United 
States to change its method of ratification of its contracts or 
agreements with Indian Nations in no way diminishes the 
capacity of Indian Nations to enter into international 
agreements. Long after the end of the classical “treaty 
                                                           
116 See G. William Rice, Teaching Decolonization: Reacquisition of Indian Lands Within 
and Without the Box—An Essay, 82 N. D. L. REV. 811, 823–24 (2006) (“As late as 1832, 
Indian Nations satisfied the four conditions for recognition as a State that would be codified 
by the International community in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States signed at 
Montevideo a little over one hundred years later on December 26, 1933.”). 
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period,” Indian Nations continued to make agreements 
with the United States, and this practice has continued to 
the present day.117 
As political relationships are formed through an understanding of both sides 
of the political relationship, the perspectives and expectations of Tribal 
Nations for the U.S. government to conform and demonstrate a 
commitment to the rule of law has not wavered. Although subsequent eras 
of U.S. Indian policy can be classified as expressions of bad faith and 
coercion, the foundational relationship and the permanent neighbor status 
of the U.S. with Tribal Nations requires a full understanding of both sides 
of the political relationship.118 
As Figure 1 (above) illustrates, U.S. Indian policy is often hard to 
categorize; for instance, two different points on the pendulum are identified 
in the 1800s, the Removal Era and the Reservation Era. On the one hand, 
the Indian Removal Act of 1830 was passed to coerce all Tribal Nations east 
of the Mississippi River to remove to lands west and relinquish their 
homelands through treaties or military action.119 On the other hand, 
reservations were recognized as seats for tribal governance and within the 
legal jurisdiction of tribal law and order.120 
The lowest point in U.S. Indian policy for American Indians was 
the Assimilation/Allotment Era, where the U.S. government kidnapped 
children for so-called civilization training at mandatory military and 
religious-run boarding schools,121 and it determined that certain reservations 
were open to allotment, parceling out tribal government-owned lands to 
individual tribal citizens.122 The General Allotment Act was the violation of 
treaty-reserved lands under tribal land law,123 as the U.S. Congress 
authorized the executive branch to declare a reservation open for allotment. 
Early allotment acts called for tribal consent, but as the U.S. Supreme Court 
espoused the “plenary authority” of the U.S. Congress, tribal consent was 
not an impediment.124 The impact of the allotment policy was devastating to 
Tribal Nations.  
                                                           
117 Id. at 827. 
118 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, n.24 (1974) (describing an employment preference 
in the U.S. Bureau of Indian affairs for Indians as a “political” preference as applying to 
members of federally recognized tribes). 
119 Pub. L. No. 21-148, 4 Stat. 411; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 103[4][a]. 
120 See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (upholding tribal laws on reservations 
for acts committed by tribal members against tribal members as outside of the authority of 
the courts of the United States). 
121 See Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation, 21 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 50–55 (2008). 
122 See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7–15 (1995). 
123 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887) (repealed 2000). 
124 See Rice, supra note 116, at 835. 
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As a result of the General Allotment Act and federal policy 
of allotment, Indian land holdings plunged from 138 
million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres by 1934. 
Fractionation of Indian interests as individual allotments 
were inherited by the decedents of the allottees pursuant to 
state inheritance laws resulted in tracts of land that were 
unusable by the owners. Colonialist treatment of Indian 
Nations and their territories became ingrained into the 
“normal” relationship between the federal government and 
the Indian Nations.125 
Consequently, the political relationships between Tribal Nations and the 
United States were at their lowest points, with the United States seeking, by 
every means of force, the opening of reservations in violation of treaties and 
agreements.126 The consequences of the allotment acts and policy will be 
discussed at greater length more fully below. 
Under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,127 the allotment 
policy was finally ended in the first section,128 with the law promoting 
consolidation and adding to the land base of reservations and tribal 
communities.129 This ushered in what is labeled as the Indian Self-
Government Era of U.S. Indian policy.130 Companion legislation was passed 
as the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936,131 and the Alaska 
Reorganization Act of 1938 for Alaska Natives.132 Although some Tribal 
Nations had operated under tribal constitutions, the policy push of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was for the adoption of pre-drafted 
constitutions with bylaws by the majority of Tribes.133  
Yet again, during the Termination Era of U.S. Indian policy, the 
U.S. Supreme Court persevered with the dispossession of land in the 
decision of Tee-hit-Ton Indians v. United States.134 The Tee-Hit-Ton Clan 
of the Tlingit Band of Alaskan Natives sued the United States under the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution for 
compensation of timber harvested from the lands they held since time 
                                                           
125 Id. 
126 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903) (stating the “plenary authority” 
of Congress to abrogate Indian treaties to open reservation lands to allotment). 
127 25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (originally 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq.). 
128 Id.  
129 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.05. 
130 EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 62, at 19–20. 
131 25 U.S.C. § 5201 et seq. (originally 25 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.). 
132 Alaska Reorganization Act of 1938, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936). 
133 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 4.04[3][a][1]. 
134 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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immemorial.135 The U.S. Supreme Court held that federal recognition must 
occur prior to any taking for compensation over the land rights of Indians.136 
This leaves unimpaired the rule derived from Johnson v. 
McIntosh, 8 wheat. 543, that the taking by the United 
States of unrecognized Indian title is not compensable 
under the Fifth Amendment. This is true not because an 
Indian or an Indian tribe has no standing to sue, or because 
the United States has not consented to be sued for the 
taking of original Indian title, but because Indian 
occupation of land without government recognition of 
ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by 
the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or 
any other principle of law.137  
The decision included derogatory language about Tribal Nations as follows:  
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of 
this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by 
force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of 
acres by treaty in return for blankets, food, and trinkets, it 
was not a sale, but the conquerors’ will that deprived them 
of their land.138  
As a result of this decision, Tribal Nations do not have compensable land 
rights unless a federal law or instrument documents those land rights. This 
decision “has been criticized for misinterpreting precedent and violating 
fundamental human rights and constitutional norms of equality.”139 Once 
more, the rule of law was not applied even-handedly for tribal government 
land rights when seeking compensation from the U.S. Government. 
As the pendulum swung to recognition of tribal governments, the 
Indian Self-Determination Era allowed for tribal governments to contract 
with the BIA to deliver social programs, law enforcement services, health 
care operations, and other treaty-guaranteed federal responsibilities. Tribal 
governments were also able to charter tribally-run schools from the BIA and 
Bureau of Indian Education140 with the enactment of the federal Indian Self-
Determination and Education Act of 1975.141  
IV. UNEVEN APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF LAW BY THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT IN RESERVATION LAND DECISIONS 
                                                           
135 Id. at 276. 
136 Id. at 291. 
137 Id. at 284–85. 
138 Id. at 289–290. 
139 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 15.09[1][d]. 
140 25 C.F.R. § 32.3. 
141 25 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (originally 25 U.S.C. § 450). 
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The term “Indian Country” is a legal term of art that has been 
defined in the criminal statutes of the United States since 1948.142 Under 
federal law, Indian Country is comprised of three types of tribal lands: “a) 
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,” 
“b) all dependent Indian communities,” and “c) all Indian allotments.”143 
During the Termination Era, state governments challenged the reservation 
status of tribal lands by asserting that federal allotment statutes inferred the 
diminishment or disestablishment of reservations.144 A number of these 
types of cases have arisen as tribal members challenged state jurisdiction 
over criminal prosecutions as invalid within existing reservations.145 
A.  Application of the Indian Country Statute and Upholding 
Reservation Status 
In the first challenge of this type, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reviewed federal laws and found that the state of Washington could not find 
an express act of Congress to alter the reservation boundaries of the Colville 
Indian Reservation.146 The Court held that allotments, as understood as the 
“issuance of any patent,” did not impact the reservation boundaries of the 
Colville Indian Reservation, referencing the 1948 Indian Country statute.147  
The next case involved the state of Oregon seeking the U.S. 
Supreme Court to find that the Klamath River Reservation was 
disestablished when a treaty fishermen sought the return of his nets from 
state wardens.148 In Mattz v. Arnett,149 the Court reviewed federal laws and, 
specifically, the 1892 allotment statute for the reservation.  
In view of the discretionary nature of this presidential 
power, Congress occasionally enacted special legislation in 
order to assure that a particular reservation was in fact 
opened to allotment. The 1892 Act was but one example 
of this. Its allotment provisions, which do not differ 
materially from those of the General Allotment Act of 
1887, and which in fact refer to the earlier Act, do not, 
alone, recite or even suggest that Congress intended 
thereby to terminate the Klamath River Reservation. See 
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 357-358 (1962). 
                                                           
142 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948). 
143 Id. 
144 See infra Section III.B. 
145 See infra Part IV. 
146 Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
147 Id. at 357–58. 
148 See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973). 
149 Id. at 482. 
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Rather, allotment under the 1892 Act is completely 
consistent with continued reservation status.150 
Reviewing other prior decisions, the Court approvingly cited to the 1909 
decision in United States v. Celestine,151 upholding federal prosecution 
within the Tulalip Reservation subsequent to allotment of the reservation.152 
In the Celestine decision, the Court set forth the principle: “when Congress 
has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part 
of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.”153 
In Mattz, the Court adhered to the legal principle that “[a] 
congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of 
the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative 
history.”154 The Court refused to infer termination of reservation status 
without express language from Congress, which was not present in the case, 
and concluded there was no intent to terminate the reservation status, 
highlighting several federal laws referring specifically to the reservation post-
allotment.155  
B.  The Attack of South Dakota and Utah Leading to U.S. Supreme 
Court Decisions 
In a series of cases involving the state of South Dakota, legal 
arguments were made asserting allotment statutes as tools for diminishing 
or disestablishing the reservations of the traditional tribal peoples, the Oceti 
Sakowin (the Seven Council Fires, also known as the 
Dakota/Lakota/Nakota or Sioux Tribes).156 The Seven Council Fires are: 
the Mdewakantonwan, Sissetonwan, Wahpetonwan, Wahpekute, 
Ihanktonwan, Ihanktonwanna, and Titonwan.157 “The first four speak the 
Dakota dialect and are referred to as a group as the Isanti (Knife) people. 
The Ihanktonwan are now commonly known as the Yankton and speak the 
Nakota dialect along with the Little Yankton or Ihanktonwanna. The 
Titonwan or Teton speak the Lakota dialect.”158 In South Dakota, there are 
nine Indian reservations, and all are the homelands of the Oceti Sakowin. 
                                                           
150 Id. at 497. 
151 215 U.S. 278 (1909). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 285. 
154 Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973). 
155 Id. at 504–05. 
156 See Angelique EagleWoman, Re-Establishing the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate’s Reservation 
Boundaries: Building a Legal Rationale from Current International Law, 29 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 239, 240 (2005) [hereinafter EagleWoman, Re-Establishing the Sisseton-Wahpeton 
Oyate’s Reservation Boundaries]. 
157 Id.  
158 Id. 
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Three major cases will be more fully explored as demonstrating the attack 
of South Dakota to undo treaty-established reservations. 
In the midst of aggressive assertions by South Dakota to alter 
reservation boundaries, the state of Utah also engaged in litigation against 
the Uintah Indian Reservation. This U.S. Supreme Court decision and the 
resulting factors will be analyzed as well. 
V. THE ATTACK ON THE SISSETON-WAHPETON LAKE 
TRAVERSE RESERVATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH DAKOTA 
In the 1975 U.S. Supreme Court decision, DeCoteau v. District 
County Court,159 the Court reviewed conflicting opinions by the Eighth 
Circuit and the South Dakota Supreme Court on the issue of whether the 
1867 treaty-established reservation boundaries remained intact post- an 
allotment act of 1891.160 The Eighth Circuit, in light of Mattz and Seymour, 
held that the Lake Traverse Reservation boundaries remained as 
established by the 1867 Treaty between the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe 
and the United States.161 The Eighth Circuit decision stated “Congress 
established the Lake Traverse reservation as a ‘permanent’ reservation in 
1867. Since that time Congress has not through clear expression or by 
innuendo shown an intention to disestablish.”162 That federal decision 
resulted from a lawsuit on behalf of tribal members charged and convicted 
within South Dakota, who challenged state jurisdiction within the Lake 
Traverse Reservation.163 In contrast, the South Dakota Supreme Court held 
in a case seeking the termination of parental rights of a tribal member, 
Cheryl DeCoteau, for her two sons, that the Lake Traverse Reservation was 
disestablished by the allotment act of 1891 with only scattered allotments 
remaining under federal jurisdiction.164 
It is worth noting that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe was not 
a party to the DeCoteau case and did not file an amicus brief to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In the mid-to-late 1970s, the Tribe was struggling to 
maintain economic viability, and it is likely that tribal leadership did not 
anticipate the devastating outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court decision.165 
                                                           
159 420 U.S. 425 (1975). 
160 Id. at 430–31.  
161 United States ex. rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 101–02 (8th Cir. 1973). 
162 Id. at 102. 
163 Id. at 100. 
164 DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428–30 (1975). 
165 See Angelique EagleWoman, U.S.-Dakota War of 1862: Wintertime for the Sisseton-
Wahpeton Oyate: Over One Hundred Fifty Years of Human Rights Violations by the 
United States and the Need for a Reconciliation Involving International Indigenous Human 
Rights Norms, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 486, 524–27 (2013) (detailing the poverty 
conditions for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe as persistent). 
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In the 6-3 decision, the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court conducted its 
analysis by first reviewing the demographics within the reservation 
boundaries as 30,000 non-Indians and 3,000 tribal members.166 This was a 
sharp departure from the legal standard of reviewing whether Congress has 
expressly changed a reservation’s status. Next, the Court discussed how 
much of the land base remained in trust status as fifteen percent in the 
1970s.167   
In reviewing the history of the 1891 allotment act, the Court drew 
on local officials’ accounts. This included accounts from those who 
pressured tribal leadership to open the reservation, and a heavily excerpted, 
unattributed newspaper article titled, “A Big Pow Wow. A Council at Big 
Brule to Urge the Opening of the Sisseton Reservation,” dated May 22, 
1889, published on the front page of the Minneapolis Tribune,168 and 
allegedly summarized comments from various tribal leaders.169 These 
extraneous sources of perspectives did not fall within the legal principle of 
whether Congress had expressly terminated the status of the reservation, 
and yet, the Court held that very result.  
While acknowledging that the tribal government under its 1966 
Constitution stated its jurisdiction based on the 1867 treaty reservation, the 
Court held this inconclusive in finding that the reservation had been 
disestablished long ago without the Tribe’s knowledge.170 The majority 
appeared to follow the rationale that because the 1891 allotment act did not 
explicitly state the reservation existed, then Congress must have intended 
that it did not.171 Using this reasoning flips the standard for altering a 
reservation and was unjustly followed in the DeCoteau decision, ostensibly 
allowing the state of South Dakota an authority not authorized by Congress. 
In sum, the DeCoteau Court majority “discovered disestablishment in the 
factors constituting the ‘surrounding circumstances and legislative 
history,’”172 which departed significantly from the clear expression to 
terminate by Congress.173 
In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the relevant actions all 
occurred within Indian Country as defined by federal law and that the 
Court’s majority decision would “tear[] the reservation asunder.”174 In 
reviewing the language of the allotment act, he stated, “[t]here is not a word 
                                                           
166 DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428. 
167 Id.  
168 See A Large Pow Wow: A Council at Big Brule to Urge the Opening of the Sisseton 
Reservation, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., May 22, 1889, at 1. 
169 DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433–34. 
170 Id. at 443–44. 
171 Id. at 445–47. 
172 Royster, supra note 122, at 32. 
173 Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973). 
174 DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 464. (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
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to suggest that the boundaries of the reservation were altered.”175 Further, 
the dissent focused on the hardship that would be caused by the majority’s 
ruling in the resulting checkerboard jurisdiction and the aggressive tactics of 
the state.176  
Checkerboard jurisdiction cripples the United States in 
fulfilling its fiduciary responsibilities of guardianship and 
protection of Indians. It is the end of tribal authority for it 
introduces such an element of uncertainty as to what 
agency has jurisdiction as to make modest tribal leaders 
abdicate and aggressive ones undertake the losing battle 
against superior state authority.177 
Legal scholars have criticized the decision as failing to uphold the rule of 
law.178 A legal hornbook highlighted that the dissent was cognizant that the 
dispute arose in state court because of “South Dakota’s aggressive assertion 
of jurisdiction over Indian children.”179 Other legal scholars criticized the 
Court’s departure from the explicit language of the allotment act and the 
failure to properly apply the Indian canons of construction to discern the 
Tribe’s understanding of the allotment act in reaching the end of the 
spectrum result of disestablishment.180 
Contrary to the majority’s ruling, the U.S. Congress has not 
disestablished the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse Reservation. This is 
evident from federal law enacted after the 1975 DeCoteau decision. In 
1984, the U.S. Congress enacted the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation 
Land Consolidation Act to increase the amount of tribally-owned lands 
within the reservation boundaries.181 This action refutes the holding of the 
majority in the DeCoteau Court and demonstrates the ongoing recognition 
of the 1867 treaty-established reservation and the congressional intent to 
fortify the reservation. 
                                                           
175 Id. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
176 Id. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
177 Id.  
178 See EagleWoman, Re-Establishing the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate’s Reservation 
Boundaries, supra note 156, at 261 (characterizing the decision as “a wrongful taking of land 
and resources from indigenous peoples.”) (citation omitted). See also, Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L. REV. 777, 780 (2006). 
179 See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 72, at 300 (2016). 
180 Id. at § 72, at 301. 
181 See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-513, 98 Stat. 2411, 2411 (1984) (“[T]he 
provisions of this Act shall govern the right to inherit trust or restricted land located within 
such States and within the original exterior boundaries of the Lake Traverse Indian 
Reservation . . . as described in article III of the Treaty of February 19, 1867 (15 Stat. 505).”). 
Note that the preamble to the law states: “Pertaining to the inheritance of trust or restricted 
land on the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation, North Dakota and South Dakota, and for 
other purposes.” Id. 
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With the tribal government absent from the decision, the 
opportunity to rectify the poorly supported DeCoteau decision in federal 
courts may still exist. The record before the U.S. Supreme Court was not 
fully developed, and the legal standard was not credibly applied. In an 
uninterrupted timeline, the U.S. Congress has expressly included the 
Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse Reservation in federal law,182 
congressional hearings,183 and reports.184 Likewise, the executive branch,185 
and federal agencies, acknowledge the Lake Traverse Reservation to the 
present day.186 Through the persistent federal acknowledgment of the 
                                                           
182 See id. 
183 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-577, at 29 (1988). 
Section 217 corrects an error of the Bureau of Indian Affairs with 
respect to first year funding for the Tiospa Zina Indian School at the 
Sisseton-Wahpeton Reservation in South Dakota. Through an appellate 
process in the BIA, it has been determined that the school should have 
received start-up costs as a new contract school in fiscal year 1987. The 
amendment directs payment from the appropriation from which the 
school should have received its funds. 
Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 116-206, at 3 (2020). 
On October 25, 2017, the Committee held a legislative hearing on the 
bill. At this hearing, the Honorable R. Trent Shores, U.S. Attorney for 
the Northern District of Oklahoma, U.S. Department of Justice, 
testified in support of the goals of S. 1942. The Honorable Dave Flute, 
Chairman, Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation, 
and Ms. Carmen O'Leary, Director, Native Women's Society of the 
Great Plains, both testified in support of S. 1942. 
Id. 
184 See 163 CONG. REC. S3797-110 (2017) (“The story of the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands 
is one of movement of the Native people that made their home on the Lake Traverse 
Reservation, where they still celebrate today.”); see also S. REP. NO. 115-220 (2018). 
On October 25, 2017, the Committee held a legislative hearing on S. 
1870. At the October 25th hearing, officials from the Departments of 
the Interior and Justice testified in favor of the bill. The three remaining 
witnesses on the panel–Dave Flute, Chairman, Sisseton Wahpeton 
Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation; Joel Boyd, Colville Business 
Councilman, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation; and 
Carmen O'Leary, Director, Native Women's Society of the Great 
Plains–also testified in support of the bill. 
Id. 
185 See Press Release, White House, President Obama Signs South Dakota Disaster 
Declaration (May 13, 2011) (providing “Federal funding is available to State and eligible local 
governments . . . as well as those portions of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation, 
Sisseton-Wahpeton Indian Reservation, and Standing Rock Indian Reservation that lie 
within these counties.”).  
186 See Tribes Served by the Great Plains Region, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR INDIAN AFF., 
https://www.bia.gov/regional-offices/great-plains/tribes-served [https://perma.cc/J8UM-
2N7C]; Interior Signs Cooperative Agreement with Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate as Next Step 
in Land Buy-Back Program: Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Reservation in 
North & South Dakota Join Latest Step in Nation-to-Nation Cooperation to Strengthen 
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reservation in the many years after the DeCoteau decision, the majority’s 
holding that Congress had inferred termination of the reservation 
boundaries through an allotment act would appear to be erroneous.187 
A.  The Attack on the Rosebud Sioux Tribe Reservation in South 
Dakota 
In the 1977 decision, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,188 the 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe filed suit for a declaratory action in federal court 
providing that three congressional acts did not alter their reservation 
boundaries.189 In another 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the Rosebud Sioux Reservation was diminished,190 although the 
congressional record relied upon was sparse at best. The majority cobbled 
together reasoning to infer congressional intent from three separate acts of 
Congress. “Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude 
that the Acts of 1904, 1907, and 1910 did clearly evidence congressional 
intent to diminish the boundaries of the Rosebud Sioux Reservation.”191 
Because the majority’s rationale required piecing together these three 
separate laws, the holding should be viewed as suspect under the rule of law 
and not conforming to the legal standard requiring a clear congressional 
expression to alter the reservation boundaries.  In dissent, Justice Marshall 
took issue with the majority’s interpretation of the three-land cession and 
allotment acts. 
Since congressional intent must be unambiguous before we 
can conclude that Congress terminated part of an Indian 
reservation, the absence of any express provision to this 
effect in the Rosebud Acts strongly militates against the 
interpretation the Court places on those Acts. But I need 
not rely on congressional silence alone eloquent as it may 
be to reject the Court’s interpretation. For both the text of 
                                                           
Tribal Sovereignty, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR INDIAN AFF., https://www.bia.gov/as-
ia/opa/online-press-release/interior-signs-cooperative-agreement-sisseton-wahpeton-oyate-
next [https://perma.cc/69WP-9VDY]. 
187 See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
The Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, granted these Indians a permanent 
reservation with defined boundaries and the right to make their own 
laws and be governed by them subject to federal supervision, 15 Stat. 
505, as amended. No more is asked here; and it must be conceded that 
the jurisdictional acts took place within the contours of that reservation. 
Id. 
188 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). 
189 Id. at 586. 
190 Id. at 614–15. 
191 Id. at 587. 
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the Acts and the circumstances surrounding their 
enactment affirmatively point to the opposite conclusion.192  
In addition, Justice Marshall argued for the proper application of the Indian 
canons of construction to resolve ambiguities in statutes to be resolved for 
the benefit of Indians.193 This decision seems to be a particularly egregious 
violation of the rule of law where the Rosebud Sioux Tribe sought a 
declaratory judgment in federal court to counter the aggressiveness of the 
state of South Dakota to gain access to reservation lands. 
B.  The Failed Attack on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in 
South Dakota 
In 1979, Cheyenne River Sioux tribal member, John Bartlett, was 
charged and convicted in South Dakota state court. Following the 
exhaustion of state remedies, he filed a writ of habeas corpus to federal court 
challenging state criminal jurisdiction on the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation.194 The state of South Dakota contended that an allotment act 
of 1908 had diminished the reservation boundaries and that state 
jurisdiction followed on the relevant portion of land for the criminal 
prosecution.195  
In Solem v. Bartlett,196 Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the 
unanimous opinion by setting out the legal analysis for review of reservation 
status by synthesizing prior decisions on the “statutory language used to 
open the Indian lands” with events surrounding and to lesser extent 
occurring after the act “to decipher Congress’s intentions.”197 In addition, 
Justice Marshall signaled approval for a pragmatic approach in finding de 
facto diminishment when lands were opened and “non-Indian settlers 
flooded into the opened portion of a reservation.”198  
In reviewing the 1908 allotment act, the Court noted that there 
was no express language to change the existing reservation boundaries.199 
Addressing the argument by South Dakota that the 1908 act included 
language referring to the return of lands to the “public domain” and a 
reference to the unallotted lands of the reservation “thus diminished,” the 
Court held that these few phrases were not enough to demonstrate 
congressional intent to diminish the reservation.200 The Court referred to 
                                                           
192 Id. at 620–21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
193 Id. at 617 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
194 Bartlett v. Solem, 691 F.2d 420, 420 (8th Cir. 1982). 
195 Id. at 420–21. 
196 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
197 Id. at 470–71. 
198 Id.  
199 See id. at 474. 
200 Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 475–76 (1984). 
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inconsistency in the understandings of the effect of the 1908 act and 
concluded that the record provided no help to either side.201 As for 
demographics in the opened areas of the reservation, the record provided 
that tribal members took allotments in those areas, and the attempt to bring 
in non-Indian settlers failed.202 
While the result in Solem led to the uninterrupted recognition of 
the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, the Court’s willingness to delve into 
extraneous factors to bolster its interpretation of the 1908 allotment act 
would prove onerous to the defense of other reservations. The result of this 
decision was to thwart the attempt by South Dakota to assert criminal 
jurisdiction over the allotted portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation,203 but this did not curtail the state’s efforts to attack other 
reservations. 
C.  The Attack on the Uintah Indian Reservation in Utah  
When the Supreme Court of Utah found diminishment of the 
Uintah Indian Reservation, the U.S. Supreme Court continued a similar 
line of reasoning in the 1994 Hagen v. Utah decision.204 The Uintah Indian 
Reservation was established by Congress in 1864 after an Executive Order 
set aside lands in the Utah Territory for the Ute Indian Tribe.205 In the 7-2 
majority decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Hagen 
Court clarified the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on carving down 
reservation lands by sharpening the following three factors which had been 
introduced earlier by the DeCoteau and Solem Courts.206  
In determining whether a reservation has been diminished, 
‘[o]ur precedents in the area have established a fairly clean 
analytical structure,’ directing us to look to three factors. [1] 
The most probative evidence of diminishment is, of 
course, the statutory language used to open the Indian 
lands. [2] We have also considered the historical context 
surrounding the passage of the surplus land Acts, although 
we have been careful to distinguish between evidence of 
                                                           
201 Id. at 478–79. 
202 Id. at 480. 
203 See id. at 481. 
204 510 U.S. 399, 421–22 (1994). 
205 Id. at 402. 
206 Id. at 410–11. See also Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 463, 466–72 (employing demographics to a 
portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation allotted by federal law and rejecting the 
argument that the allotment should be construed to diminish the reservation boundaries); 
Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1081–82 (2016) (finding that changing demographics 
was the least compelling factor in determining that an allotment act of 1882 did not diminish 
the Omaha Indian Reservation). 
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the contemporaneous understanding of the particular Act 
and matters occurring subsequent to the Act’s passage. [3] 
Finally, ‘[o]n a more pragmatic level, we have recognized 
that who actually moved onto opened reservation lands is 
also relevant to deciding whether a surplus land Act 
diminished a reservation.’207 
These so-called factors stray from the legal standard of whether Congress 
explicitly altered a reservation’s boundaries.208  
The Court selected language from a 1902 allotment act plan that 
required the consent of the Ute Indian Tribe and contained language on 
restoring any unallotted lands to the “public domain” to be sold.209 Reading 
the 1902 language into the actual law that opened the reservation to 
allotment in 1905, which omitted the restoration language,210 the majority 
held, in agreement with the state of Utah, that both acts read together had 
demonstrated an intent by Congress to diminish the reservation.211 The Ute 
Indian Tribe had persistently withheld consent to allotment as President 
Theodore Roosevelt ordered allotment to occur under the 1905 allotment 
                                                           
207 Hagen, 510 U.S. at 410–11 (internal citations omitted, numbering added for clarity). 
208 See, e.g., Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973). 
209 Hagen, 510 U.S. at 412. 
210 See Lauren Natasha Soll, The Only Good Reservation is a Diminished Reservation?, 41 
FED. B. NEWS & J. 544, 547 (1994).  
[T]he Court discounted the language and surrounding circumstances of 
the only act actually implemented--the Act of March 3, 1905--and 
instead reached back to the Act of May 27, 1902 to find the restoration 
language upon which it ultimately relied to make its conclusion. Citing 
Rosebud, the Court insisted that the 1905 Act was merely an 
amendment of the 1902 Act and, therefore, the language of the earlier 
act necessarily carried forward. In so doing, however, the Court not only 
disregarded the rule requiring that all ambiguities must be resolved in 
favor of the Indians but also ignored evidence that the circumstances 
surrounding the 1905 Act were materially different from those attending 
the 1902 Act. For example, the legislature had intentionally erased the 
restoration language of the earlier statutes and instead employed the 
term “opening” throughout the 1905 Act. Though it concededly is 
impossible from the evidence to discern the reason for the erasure, as 
the dissenting justices admonished the majority, all doubts should have 
been resolved in the favor of the Ute Indian Tribe. 
Id. 
211 Id. at 415–16 (“The 1905 Act did not repeat these essential features of the opening, 
because they were already spelled out in the 1902 Act. The two statutes—as well as those that 
came in between—must therefore be read together.”). 
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act.212 The twisted reasoning of the Court then applied the three factors 
weighing against the Tribe’s defense of its reservation homelands.213 
In regard to demographics, the Court provided a rather pointed 
concern for non-Indians over Indians. “This ‘jurisdictional history,’ as well 
as the current population situation in the Uintah Valley, demonstrates a 
practical acknowledgment that the Reservation was diminished; a contrary 
conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people 
living in the area.”214 
In dissent, Justice Blackmun first repeated a quote from another 
dissent on the failure of the Court to uphold the treaty rights of Tribal 
Nations.  
“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word,” 
FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142, 80 
S.Ct. 543, 567, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting), 
and we do not lightly find that Congress has broken its 
solemn promises to Indian tribes.215 
Returning to the legal standard for the alteration of Indian reservation 
boundaries, Justice Blackmun set forth the legal standard as requiring 
express language from Congress and requiring the application of the Indian 
canon of construction that ambiguities in statutes be resolved for the benefit 
of the Indians.216 Further, the dissent noted that the majority misapplied the 
latter in favor of the state in its interpretation of the surplus land act of 
1905.217 
From the Hagen Court, Justice O’Connor ushered in a complete 
divergence from the rule of law to allow the U.S. Supreme Court to consider 
factors that cannot weigh in favor of Tribes.218 The first factor is the statutory 
                                                           
212 See EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide, supra note 6, at 
436–38. 
Theodore Roosevelt served as United States President from 1901 to 
1909, one of the worst United States Indian policy eras, referred to as 
the allotment and assimilation era. This era is where social 
experimentation was perpetuated on American Indian children and 
tribal lands forcibly taken in violation of treaties signed with the United 
States. 
Id. 
213 Hagen, 510 U.S. at 412–22. 
214 Id. at 421.  
215 Id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
216 Id. at 422–24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
217 Id. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
218 See Royster, supra note 122, at 41; Richard L. Barnes, A Woman of the West, But Not 
the Tribes: Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the State-Tribal Relationship, 58 LOY. L. REV. 
39, 95 (2012). 
By using the public domain gambit, Justice O'Connor conflated the use 
of the land with the question of who should govern it. It was the 
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language, but as noted by the dissent and precedent, interpretation of 
treaties, statutes, and other U.S. derived law applied to tribal governments, 
ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the Indians.219 The second factor 
on the “contemporaneous understanding” of these allotment and surplus 
acts is informed from non-Indians’ writings, newspaper articles, and other 
opinion pieces, which will favor dispossession of tribal lands.220 The third 
factor can, but rarely, weighs in favor of Tribal Nations as the Court reviews 
the demographics of who settled onto the open lands, as common sense 
would provide that Indians usually do not re-settle on their own lands.221 
D.  The Attack on the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota 
When the Yankton Sioux Tribe sought a declaratory judgment in 
federal court on the basis that its reservation boundaries were unaltered by 
a 1894 allotment act, the lawsuit resulted in a contrary decision by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe.222 Justice 
O’Connor delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court in finding 
diminishment occurred more than one hundred years prior to the lawsuit.223 
The impetus for the lawsuit was the attempt by South Dakota to locate a 
waste dump with a subpar clay lining within the tribal reservation boundaries 
near Lake Andes.224 
                                                           
Secretary of the Interior, acting in violation of the will of the Tribe and 
perhaps Congress, who opened the reservation for settlement and 
created the conditions that made it seem less like Indian Country. 
Id. 
219 See FLETCHER, supra note 179, at 307. 
220 See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1654 (1996). 
Bedrock principles of Indian law, applied continuously from the 
nation's founding until recently, left Indian country largely to tribal 
governance, except to the extent that Congress expressly extended 
federal or state jurisdiction or limited tribal powers. Supreme Court 
decisions have begun to depart from these foundation principles. Those 
decisions have been based essentially on the Justices' subjective 
judgments about how they ought to allocate sovereign authority over 
non-Indians in Indian country in order to avoid cultural clashes. This 
subjectivist approach has now attracted the majority of the present Court 
away from the weight of precedent in Indian law. 
Id. 
221 See Charlene Koski, The Legacy of Solem v. Bartlett: How Courts Have Used 
Demographics to Bypass Congress and Erode the Basic Principles of Indian Law, 84 WASH. 
L. REV. 723, 750 (2009). 
222 522 U.S. 329, 329, 358 (1998). 
223 Id. at 358. 
224 Id. at 341. 
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Justice O’Connor applied the sharpened test announced in 
Hagen and proceeded to find language of cession,225 which the Court 
interpreted as an intent towards diminishment, although the purpose of 
allotment acts was for Congress to buy reservation land to open those 
purchased lands to settlers within the reservations.226 The Yankton Sioux 
Tribe asserted that the 1894 act included a savings clause that should be 
read to uphold the terms of the 1858 treaty-established reservation.227 
“Article XVIII of the agreement, a saving clause, stated that nothing in its 
terms ‘shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty’ and that ‘all 
provisions of the said treaty . . . shall be in full force and effect, the same as 
though this agreement had not been made.’”228 The Court failed to apply the 
Indian canons of construction in favor of the Indians and instead accepted 
the argument of South Dakota that the savings clause should not be so 
literally interpreted.229 
To add insult to injury, the Court drew upon the record from a 
Council meeting between the starving Yankton Sioux and government 
commissioners as focused on “many references to the Government’s failure 
to fulfill earlier promises” and no reference to the 1858 reservation 
boundaries.230 Reciting more statements from government officials’ reports, 
the Court concluded that the “contemporaneous understanding” of the 
1894 allotment act was to diminish the reservation.231 As for demographics, 
the presence of mostly non-Indians with a few Indian allotments was 
considered by the Court as a diminishment factor.232 The Court also 
approved of the aggressiveness of South Dakota in asserting “virtually 
unchallenged” jurisdiction over the open area of the reservation as 
evidencing diminishment.233 
In holding the Yankton Sioux Reservation diminished,234 the U.S. 
Supreme Court unanimously betrayed the rule of law in favor of factors 
                                                           
225 Id. at 344–45. 
226 Id. at 356. 
227 Id. at 345. 
228 Id. at 339. 
229 Id. at 345–346. 
230 Id. at 347. 
231 Id. at 354–55. 
232 Id. at 356–57. See James M. Grijalva, Robert Laurence, Alex Tallchief Skibine, Frank 
Pommersheim & N. Bruce Duthu, Diminishment of Indian Reservations: Legislative or 
Judicial Fiat?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 415, 417–18 (1995). “Any test that starts by saying that it is 
looking for ‘clear’ indications of congressional intent and then lists as a factor in determining 
the clear intent the present day demographics of the reservation cannot legitimately talk in 
terms of clear indications of congressional intent.” Id. at 417 (comment by Alexander 
Skibine). 
233 Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 357. 
234 Id. at 358. 
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weighing against Tribal Nations due to the constant pressure to dispossess 
Indians of their homelands.235  
Thus, four of the above highlighted cases demonstrate the 
unceasing attack of South Dakota to gain approval by the highest federal 
court in the United States to disrupt and destroy the reservation status of the 
Sioux Tribal Nations. Similarly, the above analysis includes a highlighted 
case involving an attack by the state of Utah, which proved to be successful 
for the state as well in the U.S. Supreme Court. Abandoning the rule of law 
in reservation boundary jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court committed 
an injustice to the plain language of the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution that “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of 
the land.”236 
VI. THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 2020 
MCGIRT V. OKLAHOMA DECISION 
With the history of twisting the legal standard to find 
diminishment intentions in allotment acts, rather than diminishment “clear 
expressions,” the treaties between Tribal Nations and the United States 
appeared to find little protection or enforcement in the U.S. Supreme Court 
regarding the permanent homeland status of reservations. When a 
challenge to state criminal jurisdiction arose in Oklahoma on the grounds 
that the alleged conduct occurred on the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
Reservation, the outcome was uncertain as the state of Oklahoma had 
perniciously denied the existence of any reservations, with the limited 
exception of the Osage Reservation.237 
                                                           
235 See Judith V. Royster, Decontextualizing Federal Indian Law: The Supreme Court’s 1997–
98 Term, 34 TULSA L.J. 329, 346 (1998).  
The Yankton Sioux decision is thus an example of the 
decontextualization of Indian law. The Court took an arguably 
reasonable rule from its prior cases—an “almost insurmountable 
presumption” of diminishment if the tribe ceded the surplus lands for a 
sum certain—and applied it despite a savings clause that explicitly 
preserved “all provisions” of the 1858 treaty which established the 
reservation boundaries. If that safeguarding of the reservation borders is 
not sufficient to overcome the presumption, then the Court has in effect 
created an irrebuttable presumption of diminishment which it will apply 
regardless of context. 
See id. at 340. 
236 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
237 See Kirke Kickingbird, “Way Down Yonder in the Indian Nations, Rode My Pony Cross 
the Reservation!” From “Oklahoma Hills” By Woody Guthrie, 29 TULSA L.J. 303, 320 
(1993).  
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A.  The Ruling on the Treaties and Federal Statutes Regarding the 
Creek Nation 
On July 9, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a long-
awaited decision on the status of the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation in 
Oklahoma. Justice Gorsuch delivered the 5-4 decision in McGirt v. 
Oklahoma.238 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion opened by acknowledging the 
traumatic history of the Muscogee Creek Nation in securing a permanent 
homeland: 
On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a promise. Forced 
to leave their ancestral lands in Georgia and Alabama, the 
Creek Nation received assurances that their new lands in 
the West would be secure forever. In exchange for ceding 
“all their land, East of the Mississippi river,” the U.S. 
government agreed by treaty that “[t]he Creek country west 
of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guarantied to the Creek 
Indians.” Treaty With the Creeks, Arts. I, XIV, Mar. 24, 
1832, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (1832 Treaty).239 
Next, the opinion explained that Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Seminole 
Nation of Oklahoma, challenged state criminal jurisdiction by asserting his 
alleged criminal conduct occurred on the Creek Reservation implicating the 
federal Major Crimes Act,240 which is operative within Indian Country.241  
In establishing the framework for the primacy of the role of 
Congress in U.S. Indian policy, the majority opinion drew upon the 
regulation of commerce by Congress under the U.S. Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause and cited to the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause 
denoting “federal treaties and statutes are the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’”242 
                                                           
Misinformed but conventional wisdom tells us that Oklahoma has no 
reservations except the Osage Reservation. This same font of wisdom 
tells us that contrary to the status of federally recognized tribes in other 
states, the state of Oklahoma has jurisdiction over tribal members and 
tribal and trust lands in Oklahoma. This broadcasting of conventional 
wisdom about the status of Indian government versus state authority 
continues despite the fact that federal court decisions for nearly two 
decades have not confirmed the misconception that tribal governments 
in Oklahoma have a status different from other tribes in the United 
States. 
Id. at 303–04. 
 
238 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020). Justice Gorsuch was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan. 
239 Id.  
240 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). 
241 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
242 McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462. 
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Citing to the Solem decision, McGirt established that the legal standard for 
review of the reservation’s status must adhere to congressional authority as 
“[o]nly Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its 
boundaries.”243 
In addressing the argument by the state of Oklahoma that the 
Creek Reservation did not survive allotment, the majority opinion in McGirt 
rejected the argument by first referencing the federal definition of Indian 
Country as “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation . . .  
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent.”244 This definition in federal law 
demonstrated that Congress intended allotment to allow for non-Indian 
settlement within reservation boundaries.245 In reviewing the statutory 
language of both the 1901 Creek Allotment Act and the 1908 Act, the Court 
found that over time the arrangement between the Creek Nation and 
Congress was adjusted with shifting policies from assimilation to 
encouragement for the Creek Nation to adopt a tribal constitution and 
bylaws in 1936.246 Regarding the history of enactments by the U.S. Congress 
and the tribal government operations, the Court concluded that “in all this 
history there simply arrived no moment when any Act of Congress dissolved 
the Creek Tribe or disestablished its reservation.”247 
The Court rejected  language from previous decisions of asserted 
steps in the analysis on the status of a reservation, in contravention of 
argument by Oklahoma that the steps of contemporary understanding and 
current demographics were required.248 Categorizing this argument as 
“mistaken,” the Court explained that “[t]here is no need to consult 
extratextual sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear.”249 
Further, Justice Gorsuch, speaking for the majority, reasoned that where a 
statute does not provide for disestablishment, then there is no purpose in 
looking to other types of evidence on the matter.250 
In turn, the Court rejected the substitution of stories for statutes 
offered by Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction on the open areas of the 
                                                           
243 Id.  
244 Id. at 2464. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 2466–67. See infra Section III.C.2.  
247 McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468. 
248 Id.  
Oklahoma even classifies and categorizes how we should approach the 
question of disestablishment into three “steps.” It reads Solem as 
requiring us to examine the laws passed by Congress at the first step, 
contemporary events at the second, and even later events and 
demographics at the third. On the State's account, we have so far 
finished only the first step; two more await. 
Id. 
249 Id. at 2469. 
250 Id. at 2469–70. 
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reservation.251 First, Oklahoma argued a longstanding practice of prosecuting 
Indians within the Creek Reservation and erroneously claimed an 
exemption to the Major Crimes Act.252 Second, the state made arguments 
for the Court to take into consideration comments during the Allotment Era 
by tribal leadership that the reservation was under threat of disestablishment 
and incorrect comments by government officials that the state had criminal 
jurisdiction.253 “Finally, Oklahoma points to the speedy and persistent 
movement of white settlers onto Creek lands throughout the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. But this history proves no more helpful in 
discerning statutory meaning.”254  
In the face of the arguments by Oklahoma, the Court did not 
waver from the rule of law and the legal standard requiring an express act of 
Congress to disestablish the Creek Reservation, which had not occurred. 
If anything, the persistent if unspoken message here seems 
to be that we should be taken by the “practical advantages” 
of ignoring the written law. How much easier it would be, 
after all, to let the State proceed as it has always assumed it 
might. But just imagine what it would mean to indulge that 
path. A State exercises jurisdiction over Native Americans 
with such persistence that the practice seems normal. 
Indian landowners lose their titles by fraud or otherwise in 
sufficient volume that no one remembers whose land it 
once was. All this continues for long enough that a 
reservation that was once beyond doubt becomes 
questionable, and then even farfetched. Sprinkle in a few 
predictions here, some contestable commentary there, and 
the job is done, a reservation is disestablished. None of 
these moves would be permitted in any other area of 
statutory interpretation, and there is no reason why they 
should be permitted here. That would be the rule of the 
strong, not the rule of law.255 
With a clear statement that the Court adhered to the rule of law in 
determining the status of reservations, the majority opinion in McGirt put 
to rest the reasoning asserted in prior litigation by state governments seeking 
the demise of reservation status by inserting extratextual sources as having 
weight with statutory interpretation. 
 Oklahoma further argued that, in the alternative, 
Congress never established a reservation for the Muscogee Creek Nation, 
                                                           
251 Id. at 2470. 
252 Id. at 2470–72. 
253 Id. at 2472–73. 
254 Id. at 2473. 
255 Id. at 2474. 
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rather the fee title received by the Tribe was not reservation land.256 The 
state also pushed the theory that the Indian lands should be considered 
dependent Indian communities under the Indian Country statute, rather 
than a reservation.257 In response, the majority opinion rebuffed the theory 
that the Creek Nation’s fee title was less secure when the Tribe had sought 
fee title as protection of the land in negotiating the provisions of the 1833 
Treaty with the United States.258 
In the final section of the opinion, Justice Gorsuch discredited the 
fears presented by the state and the dissent that the Court’s opinion “could 
unsettle an untold number of convictions and frustrate the State’s ability to 
prosecute crimes in the future.”259 Because of criminal law procedure in both 
state and federal courts, the majority opinion reassured the state and the 
dissent that their fears were “speculative” and that harsher sentencing in 
federal courts may not be a risk that some would opt for.260 
Regardless of the consequences for criminal prosecution or the 
other fears espoused, the Court articulated that “the magnitude of a legal 
wrong is no reason to perpetuate it.”261 As the dissent and the state asserted 
drastic consequences for civil and regulatory matters, the Court countered 
that “Oklahoma and its Tribes have proven that they can work together as 
partners” and mentioned the many intergovernmental agreements active 
with the Creek Nation.262 
In the final words of the decision, the following was expressed on 
the long overdue justice in the case before the Court: “Unlawful acts, 
performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to 
amend the law. To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most brazen and 
longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding wrong and failing those 
in the right.”263 
B.  Dissenting to Disavow Reservation Status 
Two dissenting opinions were filed in the case. In the first 
dissenting opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts was joined with Justices Alito, 
Kavanaugh, and Thomas. The second dissenting opinion was filed alone by 
                                                           
256 Id. at 2474–76. 
257 Id.  
258 Id. at 2475. The Court further rejected arguments by Oklahoma that the Major Crimes 
Act did not apply in the state and state criminal jurisdiction was necessary for minor crimes 
between Indians outside the purview of that law because Congress had once abolished tribal 
courts. Id. at 2476–78. 
259 Id. at 2479. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 2480. 
262 Id. at 2480–81. 
263 Id. at 2482. 
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Justice Thomas, raising a procedural issue under state law.264 Both dissents 
reached the conclusion that the Creek Reservation did not survive 
Oklahoma statehood.265  
In the dissent led by Chief Justice Roberts, he took issue with the 
majority’s determination that the statutory interpretation did not require 
resorting to extraneous sources as had been done in prior Court decisions. 
Under those precedents, we determine whether Congress 
intended to disestablish a reservation by examining the 
relevant Acts of Congress and “all the [surrounding] 
circumstances,” including the “contemporaneous and 
subsequent understanding of the status of the reservation.” 
Yet, the Court declines to consider such understandings 
here, preferring to examine only individual statutes in 
isolation.266 
Reviewing the extratextual record, the Roberts dissent found probative 
newspaper commentary by tribal leaders,267 the lifting of certain restrictions 
by Congress on Creek lands,268 assertion of state criminal jurisdiction,269 and 
the “settled understanding” of precedents.270 This dissenting opinion may be 
summed up in the following line from the opinion: “In addition to their 
words, the contemporaneous actions of Oklahoma, the Creek, and the 
United States in criminal matters confirm their shared understanding that 
Congress did not intend a reservation to persist.”271  
C.  Return to the Rule of Law in Federal Jurisprudence on 
Reservation Status 
For far too long, the U.S. Supreme Court indulged in bringing the 
worst of the Assimilation/Allotment Era policies into the analysis for 
contemporary recognition of reservation status. By engaging in extratextual 
factors that were unlikely to weigh in favor of continued reservation status, 
the decisions prior to the McGirt Court strayed from the rule of law and 
statutory interpretation norms applied for every other area of law.272 To 
                                                           
264 Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas raised the 
procedural issue of whether the Court should have taken up the case on the question of 
federal criminal jurisdiction when state law barred the issue on appeal as not raised in the 
state trial court. Id. at 2503. 
265 Id. at 2502–03. 
266 Id. at 2482 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
267 Id. at 2496. 
268 Id. at 2498. 
269 Id. at 2499. 
270 Id. at 2502. 
271 Id. at 2496. 
272 Id. at 2474 (majority opinion). 
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determine reservation status, the legal standard is “[t]he first and governing 
principle is that only Congress can divest a reservation of its land and 
diminish its boundaries.”273 This standard requires a straightforward 
statutory interpretation which the U.S. Supreme Court and all courts 
regularly engage in to determine the meaning of legislated laws. 
In the field of federal Indian law, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
directed the use of Indian canons of construction to fairly interpret treaties, 
statutes, and regulations issued for the benefit of Indians. Through the 
decisions on reservation status, the Court has rarely adhered to the use of 
the Indian canons of construction to interpret ambiguities as the Indians 
would have understood the language of treaties and allotment acts.274 A 
constant criticism has been the interpretation of the Court-supplied factor 
on “contemporaneous understandings” to override the Indian perspective 
with writings from non-Indian sources supporting dispossession of Indian 
lands.275  
The third factor focusing on demographics was announced by 
Justice Thurgood Marshall in the unanimous Solem decision where the 
opened areas of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation led to tribal 
members moving into those areas and staying in those areas. This was not 
the usual scenario upon the opening of reservation lands under pressure 
from White local and national figures to encourage White homesteading 
and entry into reservation territories.276 When the demographics analysis was 
applied in the Hagen and Yankton Courts, the destruction of reservation 
status was bolstered by noting the number of non-Indians in the opened 
areas. A demographics factor is patently unfair as the U.S. has waged a 
                                                           
273 Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). 
274 See Getches, supra note 220, at 1621–22. 
275 See Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts of Allotment-
Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 131 (2012).  
While the Supreme Court routinely relies on the “justifiable 
expectations” of non-Indian purchasers to support rulings that are 
adverse to tribes, the Court never uses historical sources to unearth the 
true substance of these expectations, nor does it explain why they were 
justifiable. These presumed expectations thus form a significant part of 
the Supreme Court's justification for impeding tribes from effectively 
governing their own reservations, and the Court's use of these 
expectations helps to maintain an atmosphere of lawlessness on 
reservations.  
Id. 
276 See Saito, supra note 57, at 44.  
Using this rationale, the Court upheld the 1887 Allotment Act, which 
converted collectively held Indian lands into individual allotments and 
allowed “surplus” land to be transferred to White settlers, despite the 
fact that the law violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
as well as the explicit terms of an 1867 treaty.   
Id.  
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genocidal campaign against American Indian populations over centuries in 
sometimes overt methods,277 and other times indirect actions putting the 
Native population at risk.278 By requiring American Indians to populate 
every portion of a reservation to keep reservation status, the U.S. is holding 
tribal peoples to a standard found in the religious doctrine of discovery, in 
so far as actual possession consummated recognized title.279 This is a 
perversion of reservation status as negotiated to reserve permanent 
homelands for the future generations of tribal peoples. 
The insertion of allotment acts to analyze the present-day status 
of reservation boundaries has been a ploy of dispossession and a violation 
of the rule of law.280 In the Court decisions in this line up to McGirt, there 
has been an attempt to convince tribal leaders that their reservations had 
been permanently altered eighty to one hundred years prior without any 
express language by Congress.281 With the McGirt decision’s enunciation of 
the rule of law, rather than “the rule of the strong,”282 the legal norms for 
Tribal Nations and the United States have been placed back on the right 
path and brought the Court’s jurisprudence into the Indian Self-
Determination Era of U.S. Indian policy. 
VII. CONCLUSION: TO RESTORE FAITH IN THE TRIBAL NATIONS-
U.S. RELATIONSHIP AS PERMANENT NEIGHBORS 
A majority of the treaties entered into by the U.S. with Tribal 
Nations in the late 1700s and 1800s contained the promise of perpetual 
“peace and friendship.”283 This promise should necessitate recognition of 
full human rights, the application of the rule of law to Tribal Nation claims, 
and fairness in court decisions.284 
                                                           
277 See DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 96–102. 
278 See EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide, supra note 6, at 
439–47. 
279 See Miller, supra note 17, at 333. 
280 See Royster, supra note 122, at 6–7. 
281 See Dean B. Suagee, A Human Rights-Based Environmental Remedy for the Legacy of 
the Allotment Era in Indian Country, 29 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 3, 6 (2014).  
Tribal nations continue to live with the detrimental legacy of the 
allotment era. The judicially imposed limits on the scope of inherent 
tribal sovereignty are an impediment to the exercise of the “on-going” 
aspect of the right to self-determination. The effects of allotment policy 
can thus be said to constitute a “continuing violation” in international 
law.  
Id.  
282 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2474 (2020). 
283 See, e.g., Kirke Kickingbird, What’s Past is Prologue: The Status and Contemporary 
Relevance of American Indian Treaties, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 603, 610–11 (1995). 
284 The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), is a 
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There is a permanent neighbor relationship between Tribal 
Nations and the U.S.; Tribal Nations will not abandon their current 
homelands and reservation.285 The U.S. does not intend to cease to exist in 
mid-North America. Thus, the time to reconcile the past and provide a way 
forward utilizing the rule of law and diplomacy is called for. The U.S. is a 
settler-nation state and in honoring the treaty relationships with Tribal 
Nations, also asserts legitimacy in securing land title for U.S. citizens under 
commonly understood legal principles.286 
For tribal peoples, the impact of leadership decisions and actions 
are reviewed for the next seven generations.287 There is an understanding 
that contemporary leadership has a responsibility to do the work now to 
provide for the children yet to come. Stewarding and protecting the tribal 
homelands is one core responsibility to those future generations.288 
Enforcing treaty rights and seeking redress for the violation of treaty rights 
are based in these concepts as well.289 
                                                           
touchstone for the full human rights that should be accorded in the relationships between 
Tribal Nations and the United States. Robert T. Coulter, The Law of Self-Determination 
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 15 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 27 (2010).  
In the United States, the right of self-determination in the Declaration 
would extend and strengthen self-determination, but it will not create 
any great change. The principal effect is likely to be to discourage the 
restriction or denial of the right by the federal government. In Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, Justice Marshall asserted that Congress could 
alter or eliminate Indian nations' powers of self-government. The UN 
Declaration has created or will create a rule of customary international 
law that the United States cannot exercise such a power to deprive 
Indian nations of their right of self-determination or self-government. 
Id.  
285 Id. 
286 Tweedy, supra note 275, at 187.  
This information suggests that non-Indians who purchased lands on 
reservations in many cases did not have justifiable expectations that they 
would take their land free and clear of any continuing tribal interest. 
This is because knowledge of such injustice conflicts with the ordinary 
meaning of justifiable expectations, and knowledge of an unjust taking 
should be interpreted to constitute notice that tribes may have some 
continuing interest in the lands. 
Id. 
287 Graham, supra note 121, at 47 (quoting The Great Law of the Haudenosaunee as “[i]n 
each deliberation, we must consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven 
generations.”). 
288 Cris Stainbrook, Indian Lands—Passing Our Most Treasured Asset to Future Generations, 
MESSAGE RUNNER, https://iltf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Message-Runner-2-
lowres.pdf [https://perma.cc/45RJ-TZZA]. 
289 Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty 
Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1619 (2000).  
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Another key responsibility lies in public education.290 As the 
permanent homelands for both Tribal Nations and the United States were 
established by treaties, executive orders, congressional land recognition acts 
and settlement acts, this basic foundation for the lands within the U.S. 
should be taught at all levels of education.291 The lands comprising Turtle 
Island are the sacred homelands of many Tribal Nations.292 More land 
acknowledgments are being incorporated into mainstream U.S. educational 
institutions and other entities.293 “An Indigenous land acknowledgment 
involves making a statement recognizing the traditional territories of the 
Indigenous peoples who have lived on the land before the arrival of 
settlers.”294 With a greater sense of the importance of the rule of law, the 
                                                           
Native Americans have consistently employed the discourse of treaty 
rights to gain recognition for the land and resource rights that have been 
wrongfully appropriated from them, to assert sovereign rights, and to 
compel the federal government to carry through on its trust obligations. 
Although treaty rights are commonly understood as political rights, they 
also have fundamental importance to the cultural survival of Native 
American people. Thus, in many ways, the discourse of treaty rights for 
Native Americans is responsive to international human rights law, which 
speaks to the obligation of national governments to ensure the cultural 
survival of distinctive ethnic groups. 
Id.  
290 See EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide, supra note 6, at 424.  
In the relationships between Tribal Nations and the United States, myth 
and storytelling have been and continue to be powerful tools in 
perpetuating the subjugation of and human rights violations against 
American Indians in judicial decisions, American history textbooks, and 
the mainstream media. The dehumanization of American Indians is a 
tradition that stems from the founding of the United States. 
Id. 
291 Cynthia Ford, Integrating Indian Law into a Traditional Civil Procedure Course, 46 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243 (1996); Samantha A. Moppett, Acknowledging America’s First 
Sovereign: Incorporating Tribal Justice Systems into the Legal Research and Writing 
Curriculum, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 267, 268–70 (2010).  
Nevertheless, the majority of law students are graduating from law 
school with little, if any, knowledge of this third sovereign—Indian tribes. 
Rather, American Indian tribal governments and tribal justice systems 
are completely omitted from most first-year curriculums. By failing to 
expose students to the tribal justice systems, law schools are not 
adequately preparing students to practice in today's legal arena. In 
addition, the failure to acknowledge the third sovereign entity 
marginalizes an entire culture. Indeed, Indians have been described as 
the ‘unknown minority.’ 
Id. 
292 See King, supra note 2, at 466 (explaining the Haudenosaunee Creation Story of Turtle 
Island).  
293 Monika Batra Kashyap, Unsettling Immigration Laws: Settler Colonialism and the U.S. 
Immigration Legal System, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 548, 575–77 (2019). 
294 Id. at 575. 
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homelands of the Tribal Nations and the United States may one day be 
home to peoples of perpetual peace of friendship on both sides of the 
treaties. The ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma was one step closer to that 
promise.295 
                                                           
295 See Kolby KickingWoman, Supreme Court Ruling ‘Reaffirmed’ Sovereignty, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY (July 9, 2020), https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/supreme-court-
ruling-reaffirmed-sovereignty-4KQXSMEtlUW4lpBGSw6pzA [https://perma.cc/G3ZT-
LNRZ]. “‘Many folks are in tears,’ said [Jonodev] Chaudhuri, ambassador of the tribal 
nation. ‘Despite a history of many broken promises, as is true with many tribal nations, the 
citizens feel uplifted that for once the United States is being held to its promises.’” Id. 
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